Institute of Sociology
of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology
of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Duka A. Ot kakogo nasledstva otkazyvayutsya rossiyskiye elity (evolyutsiya smysla Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny vo vlastnom diskurse) [What inheritance do Russian elites refuse? (evolution of the meaning of the Great Patriotic War in the power discourse)]. Vlast’ i elity [Power and Elites], 2020, 7 (2): 97–128. (In Russian)



Duka A. Ot kakogo nasledstva otkazyvayutsya rossiyskiye elity (evolyutsiya smysla Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny vo vlastnom diskurse) [What inheritance do Russian elites refuse? (evolution of the meaning of the Great Patriotic War in the power discourse)]. Vlast’ i elity [Power and Elites], 2020, 7 (2): 97–128. (In Russian)
ISSN 2410-9517
DOI 10.31119/pe.2020.7.2.5

Posted on site: 22.12.20

 


Abstract

The article examines the production of the meanings of the Great Patriotic War by the power groups of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Any war presupposes the definition of the enemy and his qualifications. This gives a qualitative definiteness to the war, makes it a political event. This procedure is associated with determining the meaning of a particular war, which is an important political act that contributes to the legitimization of the regime and the existence of power groups. Moreover, comprehending war, power groups and the population include it in the already existing semantic world. Elites may try to influence this process. But their options are limited. The original definition of World War II as imperialist with the entry of the Soviet Union into it has undergone a radical rethinking. The use of the name of the defensive war as Patriotic war, which has already existed since the 19th century, helped in understanding it as a nationwide and just one. The return to the imperious political discourse of these meanings was superimposed on the characteristics of the existing regime, state structure and economic system. At the same time, in Soviet and Communist party documents, in Stalin's speeches, the goal of German aggression was indicated: the destruction of the Soviet system. And the enemy was defined accordingly — German fascism. Thus, the legitimization of the social and state system is enhanced. At the same time, there was a redefinition of allies, enemies, aggressors. England and France turned from aggressors into allies. At the end of the war, the motives for the superiority of socialism and Soviet power in connection with victory become the main ones. But since the 1970s, there has been a gradual change in military discourse, which was associated with a Detente. The end of the existence of the USSR, the main winner in the Great Patriotic War, turns it into, first of all, a historical fact: there is no socialist system and the Soviet state, which won. The rhetoric of war and the meaning of war has been greatly transformed. If the main motive at the beginning of the war and at its end was clearly class, then in modern Russian power discourse it loses this Soviet core. The war appears to a greater extent as an interstate war. In the discourse about war, in contrast to the initial nationwide war and struggle with the enemy, the element of sacrifice prevails. These motives are reinforced by the emerging new practices, the most important of which is the “Immortal Regiment”. There is also a rethinking of the “people” as a winner in the war. Accordingly, the mission in the war of the Soviet Union is also being transformed.